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Some academics have raised concerns that copyright law might be in conflict with First Amendment
free speech law. Some scholars fear that copyright law might restrict the free flow of information in
the marketplace of ideas. The typical answer to such concerns, embodied in the Supreme Court
cases Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises and Eldred v. Ashcroft, is that copyright
law contains internal doctrinal mechanisms, namely the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use,
which alleviate free speech concerns. Copyright law protects only expressions, not ideas or facts; so
where free speech might encourage an idea or fact to be widely disseminated, copyright law would
restrict it. The idea-expression dichotomy holds that ideas and facts are not within the subject matter
of copyright protection. Therefore, the media is free to report on facts and spread ideas, so long as
they do so using expressions alternative to those protected by copyright.
Commentators argue that sometimes the free-speech interest in spreading knowledge requires use of
copyrighted expressions. These commentators suggest that cases that conflict with free speech might
require the creation of a distinct free-speech defense to copyright infringement.
However, there is no need for a distinct free-speech defense. Copyright law already contains a
doctrine, the merger doctrine, which, if properly applied, would reconcile copyright law and freespeech law in cases where expressions are necessary in order to effectively spread ideas or for the
press and news media to report on facts. The merger doctrine was developed in two cases, Morrissey
v. Procter & Gamble Co. and Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian.
In Morrissey, a manufacturer claimed copyright in the text describing the rules of a contest wherein
consumers could mail in a box top to be entered to win a prize. The First Circuit determined that the
manufacturer had no copyright in the contest terms, holding that the expression had “merged” with
the idea. The court reasoned that because there are only a small, finite, and limited number of ways to
express the idea of such a contest, and because the contest itself is not protectable subject matter, a
finding of ownership of the expression would have granted ownership of the idea of a contest.
In Kalpakian, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s jeweled bee pins, which were similar in
appearance to plaintiff’s own pins, infringed its copyright. The Ninth Circuit held that the pins did not
infringe, because it was impossible to create a pin using a small number of jewels that looks like a bee
without the pin looking similar to all other such jeweled bee pins. Therefore, the idea of a jeweled bee
pin and the expression had merged. The court said that the intellectual property rights in such an item
would properly be the subject of protection under patent law, not copyright law.
The merger doctrine essentially dictates that where there are very few ways to express an idea or fact,
such that exclusive ownership of those expressions would be tantamount to a copyright in the noncopyrightable idea or fact, there is no copyright in the expression. In every case where the expression
is necessary to effectively communicate an idea or report upon a fact, a court could apply merger

doctrine to find that no copyright exists. A brief analysis of how merger doctrine could have been
applied in two cases might illustrate its potential for alleviating free speech concerns.
In Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., the plaintiff owned the copyright in the Zapruder film, which
happened to be the only direct video footage of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. The
defendant copied frames of the Zapruder film and used them as illustrations in a book that put
forward a particular forensic theory regarding the assassination. The plaintiff sued, alleging copyright
infringement. The judge held that such use of the plaintiff’s film was a “fair use” outside the limits of
copyright protection, but perhaps the court could have arrived at the same conclusion under the
merger doctrine’s reasoning since only a single video of the assassination exists. If there was factual
visual information about the assassination contained in the film for which there was no substitute,
then enforcing the plaintiffs copyright in some circumstances could provide the copyright-holder
control over non-copyrightable visual aspects of the JFK assassination, therefore indicating that the
fact and the expression had merged.
There is a line of Second Circuit and Southern District of New York cases from the 1980s involving
copyright infringement by writers of famous authors’ biographies. In these cases, biographers quoted
the authors’ writings in their biographies without the authors’ permission. These cases
include Salinger v. Random House Inc., Craft v. Kobler, and New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt &
Co. Judge Leval of the Southern District of New York, who heard more than one of these opinions,
found that the biographers’ copying was permissible—but was reversed on appeal by Second Circuit
Judges Newman and Miner. In Salinger, Judge Leval argued that some quoting was necessary for the
biographer to convey the writing style of the author. Judge Newman disagreed, arguing that the
expression was protected by copyright, and therefore not available to be used without permission in
the biography. Here too, the merger doctrine could have been applied. Salinger’s writing was being
used to show facts about the writing style. The writing itself is copyrightable subject matter, but the
fact that it was written, and the fact that the writing was written in that style, are facts. Facts are not
copyrightable subject matter. If the quotes were one of a limited number of means to present
information about the author’s writing style, which is factual information and cannot be accurately
conveyed merely by verbally describing it, then a merger doctrine defense should prevail.
In New Era Publications v. Henry Holt, Judge Leval reasoned that quotes from the writings of L. Ron
Hubbard had been used by the biographer to show that Hubbard was racist against Asians, and was
dishonest and paranoid. In response to the plaintiff’s argument that the biographer could have merely
stated “Hubbard was a racist” instead of copying portions of Hubbard’s protected expression which
proved that fact, Judge Leval argued that it should be for the reader and not the biographer to reach a
conclusion based upon the evidence, and that the quotes were factual information relating to
Hubbard’s life. The Second Circuit ruled against the fair use claims in New Era, based in part upon
the since-overturned presumption against fair use of unpublished works. In New Era Judge Leval and
the Second Circuit could have held that the copyrighted expressions had merged with the facts about
Hubbard which could only be directly shown to readers by means of the biographer quoting the
quotes. Thus, for the limited purpose of showing those facts about Hubbard such as his personality,
his life, and his writing style, the merger doctrine should have been a defense to copyright
infringement. The merger doctrine argument that the author’s expressions had merged with those
facts about the author’s life or literary style which could only be adequately shown by the quoted
expressions was never explicitly made in these cases.
In conclusion, the merger doctrine and the free speech defense are logically intertwined. If a
copyrighted expression is absolutely necessary in order to disseminate an idea, to report on a fact or
convey information, then the merger doctrine should apply. Where copyrighted expression is not
necessary to do so, there is no need for a distinct free speech defense to copyright infringement

because the idea or fact could be conveyed by alternative expressions without use of copyrighted
expression.

The views expressed here are exclusively of the author and do not represent agreement or
endorsement by the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law, or Yeshiva University.

